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"Stacking" occurs when an in-
sured recovers benefits by combining
multìple limits of a specific automobile
insurance coverage such as Uninsured
Motorist, Undednsured Motorist, or
Medical Pay under policies issued by
the same auto insurance company,
"Stacking'l applies to aggregation of
coverages by reason of multiple atrtos
insured under a single policy as well as
multiple autos insured under separate
policies as long as the autos are in-
sured rpith the same company. Stack-
ing issues arose with the marketing of
first-parfy Uninsured Motorist cover-
age in the 1970s which marketing was
spurred by the statutes such as Mon-
tana's Sec. 33-23-2OI MC,A. requiring
mandatory offer of UM òoveia$e.'
Stacking issues followed the availabil-
ity of Underinsured Motorist coverage
INsun¡.NcE Cowsuwrnn. CouNISELts Cor,uvrN
'sSractrrNct' IN MoNr¡ua IN, L999
B l, PRo¡'essoR GREG Mu¡vno
' ., :.
in dre 1980s after states passed
mandatory liability protection statutes
such as Montana's Sec. 67-6-307
MC,t (incorporating the minimum
limis of Sec. 6L-6-103 MCA). Litiga-
tion of stacking issues duting the last
three decades reflects the fact that
'A.merican homes once featured single
cargarages and sport three car garages
in the 1990s. The expansion of fleets
of commercial vehicles gave stacking
issues additjonal importance in terms
of repercussions for insurers and buy-
ers of business auto coverage.
The 1997 Lege (to borrow Molly
Iwin's terrn) passed two acts, Ch.263
and 495, L. 7997, amending the 1981
anti-stacking starute, Sec. 33-23-207
MCA., with the avowed putpose of
blocking' stacking of any aùtomobile
insurance coverage in Montana. Per-,
haps the , saddest and 'most anti-
consumer aspect of the amendments
is the public policy that they sup-
planted. Since the Montana Supreme
Court first allowed recovery of multi-
ple Uninsured Motorist timits in Su11r'-
van u. Doe, I59 Mont. 50, 495 P.2d
193 in 1972, it has consistently sup-
ported its stacking decisions with the
public policy statement that insur-
ers should not be able to include in
policies language that defeats cover-
ages for which the consurner has paid
a premium. In 1997, the legislature
tmmped almost 30 years of adherence
to that consumer-friendly public
policy with a statute that says insurers
may in fact collect premiums for
policies, v¡hose. language defeats the
coverage bought.
Nevertheless, reports of the
demise of stacking may be premature.
First, for an indefinite time, the state
courts will still be litigating stacking
issues fgr glaþant9 i"îaugi in agtã
¿ccidents and 'covered by insuiance
policies whose policy terrns were al-
ready underway at rhe dme of the
effective date of the 1997 anti-stacking
amendments. Second, Ch. 495, L.
1997, while clear in its overall intent
to prohibit stacking in all forrns, is
likely to be the subiect of challenge
in the courts on several grounds that
will be discussed later. Consequend¡
issues of stacking of auto inJurance
policy coverages will be relevant for
several more years even if the 7997
amendments are the effective death
knell for stacking in Montana. Conse-
quently; counsel for insurance con-
swne(s'v¡ill need to know ¡vhat law
applies to each of three classes of
possible stacking claims as will be dis-
cussed below.
Some stacking history is impor-
tant here. Under the aegis of a consis-
tent public polic¡ the court, over the
past three decades, developed a well-
reasoned and cohesive set of cases
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dealing with stacking questions in
Montana. In 1972, when two police
patrolmen were injured in a head-on
collision with a¡r auto thief in BuLte,
the Montana Supreme Court allowed
them to recover UM benefits under
the'City of Butte's auto policy and
under each of their own single poli-
cies. SuLliuan v. Doe, 159 Mont. 50,
495 P.2d 193. Technically, that was
not stacking, since it involved recov-
ery of a single limit on policies with
different companies, However, in
Chatree v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., et
al, I81 Mont. 1, 59'J. P.2d 7102
(1979), the co'rrt stacked three UM
coverages under a single policy where
the insureds paid separate premiums
to insure three motor vehicles with
USF&G. The court noted that UM
coverage is not dependent on the in-
sured "occupfrg' th. vehicle rramed
in the policy and said that it depends
on the premiums paid and not on the
number of policies. The court held
that the attempt to resttict UM cover-
age to one limit by placing three vehi-
cles under one :polict ,vjola_ted Sec.
33.23-207 MCA wìjòh mandates that
insurers offer UM coverage to protect
against t+j""y by owners ã, op.."torc
of uninsured motoi vehicles.
Five months later, the court re-
viewed a casc in which a young
woman named Kim Kemp was killed
in a collision with an uninsured
motorist while a passenger in one
of two autos insured by Allstate in
Verrnont for UM.coverage under a
single policy. Kemp's parents insured
three autos in New York paying
separate premiums under the same
policy. The case became nationally
significant when the court stacked
the UM coverages under both policies
allowing Kemp's estate recove ry of all
6ve lrnrits. Kemp v. Allstate Ins, Co.,
183 Mont. 526,601P.zd20 (1979).
While insurers could tolerate
stacking where separâte premiums
were paid for separate policies, they
cotrld not abidc the result of Chatree
v. USF&G and Kemp w Allstate
which stacked coverages for vehicles
insured under the same policy. What
was worse, the employei in'a claim
that u¡ould later reach the Supreme
Court as Guiberson v. Ifartford Cas.
fns. Co., 277 Mont. 27g, 7 04 P.2d, 68
(1985), insured 14 delivery vehicles
with State Farrn, presumably under
some qpe of fleet polic¡ and claimant
Guiberson's lawyers were arguing that
he should be entitled to stack all 14
UM limits of 925,000 each for a total
UM recovery of $350,000. Such
prospects resulted in industry lobbying
which led to passage of the first "anti-
stacking" act, Ch. 21,2,L.1981 codi-
ñed in Sec. 33-23-203MCA.
The statute took effect in Octo-
ber of 1981 and appeared to block
stacking of all coverages but only in
those situations in which multiple
vehicles were ínsured under the same
policy. It is interesting to note that,
in the years after the statute, State
Farm placed an insured's multiple
vehicles under separate policies and
collected separate premiurrr-s, and
Farrners Insurance Company placed
an insured's multiple vehicles under
the same policy collecting sçarate
premiums, while USF&G and Allstate
placed multiple vehicles' under the
same policy but rçortedly charged
a single premium for UM coverage.
In 1993, ln Bennett v. State
Fatm Mut. Auto. fns. Co., 261,
Mont. 386, 862P.2d 1146, the court
declared void State Farn's "other
insurance" clause which prohibited
stacking of Underinsured Motorist
coverage where the autos were insured
undet separate policies.with the same
insurer. State Farrn's clause provided
that "the total limits of liability under
all such coverages shall not exceed
that of the coverage with the highest
limit of liability..." The court noted
that it had historically embodied in its
decisions stacking UM coverage the
public policy "that an insurer may
not place in a¡r insurance policy a
provision that defeats coverage for
which the insurer has received
valuable consideradon." The court
rejected as irrelevant State Farm's
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position that such public policy
applied only to UM coverage which
is protected by statute (Sec. 33-23-201
MCA), stating that "the pu¡pose of
underinsured motorist coverage is to
provide a source of indemnification
for accident victims when the tort-
feasor does not provide adequate
indemnification." The court reasoned
that the public policy that favors
adequate compensation for accident
victims is supported by the same
publìc policy considerations that
invalidated anti-stacking provisions
in UM coverage. Finall¡ the court
found that the insured should be en-
titled to a reasonable expectation of
UIM coverage up to the aggregate
limits of the policies purchased.
The court limited the ability of
passengers who are not family mem-
bers tg stack UM and Medical Pay
coverage n Chilberg v. Rose, 273
Mont. 414, 903 P.zd 1377 (1995).
There it upheld Mid-Cenrury Insur-
ance Company's,UM' definition of
"insured" that required passengers to
be "occupþg" the insured vehicle
to recover bene6ts. The policies in-
volved covered the named insured
and "any other person while occupy-
ing your insured car." The court held
that Chilberg could by de6nition only
be an "insured" in the vehicle he was
"occupþg" as a pâssenger. It distin-
guished its decisions stacking UM
coverage tn Sayers u. Safeco Ins. Co.
ofAmerica, 192 Mont. 336, 628 P.2d
659 (1981) and in Kemp, supta,
because each passenger in those cases
\qas ân "insured" by definitions r.urder
those policies. The court, n Chilberg,
affirrned its history of allowing stack-
ing urd its long-time public policy
rationale of 'þrchibiting insurers
from defeating coverage which the
insured reasonably expected" þy
papng separate premiums], but noted
that a passenger like Chlberg has not
paid the premiums for the coverage
and has no such expectation.
In 1996, in Farmers AIIíance
Mut. fns. Co. v. Ifoleman,
("Ifoleman I') 278 Mont.274,924
P.2d 1375; the' court ruled that the
anti-stacking statute did not apply to
the non-compulsory Underinsured
Motorist a¡rd Medical Pay coverages.
The court deterrnined that the statute
applied only to a "motor vehicle liabil-
ity policy'' and that the terrn meant
only the lìability coverages reqtrired by
stâtute. Under the Motor Vehicle Lia-
bility Act, Sec. 61-ó-301 MCA (which
inco¡porates requirements from the
Motor Vehicle Safety and Responsibil-
ity Act, Sec. 61-6-103[2] MCA), the
legislature requires per person, per
vehicle, and properry damage liabiliry
cover¿ge for protection of third
parties. The court recognized those
coverages as constituting a "motor
vehicle liability policy'' within the
meaning of the anti-stacking st¿tute.
llowever, since the legislature also re-
quires, as part of Montana's statutory
scheme, a minimum first-party Unin-'
sured Motorist coverage under Sec.
33-23-201MCA, the court also recog-
nized Uninsured Motorist coverage as
a required or'compulsory .orrJrug.
which, was expressly, included and
could not be stacked under the anti-
stackirig statutêI. Ultimatel¡ the court
determined Underinsured Motorist
coverage and Medical Pay coverage to
be "excess'? or,r'additional'Ì cóverages
AEM¡NISTRATIVE RULES.of MONTANA oTT CD.ROM!
SEARCIIING the ARMs on CD is: cost-effective, easy & fast!
Using electronic research material will:
SAVE YOU TIME, SAVE SPACE & pnovmE cor\TvENTENCE
Ê Never again worry about whether or not the updates have been inserted into
your hooks. Your CD is replaced quarter¡y w¡th the uBdated version!
Let the ARMs CD restore your confidence in the research material your using!
P Powerful, simple .& fast search commands find the relevant Rule with a word, phrase or number search!È Access the entire set of ARMs from any computer. You can transþort CDs effortlessly!
The ARMs CD can replace all those cumbersome books that take up so much room.
$¡gS.OO lnitial Subscription &
$ SS.OO Per Quantêr
Or ...... $ 48.00 A Month
State Reporter Publ¡sh¡ng Cornpany
F.O. Box 749 Helena, MT 59624
FÞl: 406-4¿t9-8889 FAX: 406.449.4085
PncB 14 TruarTneNos - Suuupn 1999
to which the anti-stacking statute did not apply and held
that the statute doesn't prohibit stacking of UIM and
Medical Pay coverage where separate premiums are paid
for each motor vehicle under a single policy.
r¡Ifoleman f" leÊt unanswered the question of
whether the insurer could prohibit stacking of "excess" o(
"addidonal" coverages through policy language. Ruck-
daschel v. State Farm Mut. Autu. fns.,285 Mont. 395,
948P.2d400 (199? didnot involve the 1981 anti-stacking
statute, because the insured sought to recover Medical Pay
coverage under three separate State Farm policies.
(Remember that the 1981 statute only blocked stacking of
limits for multiple vehicles under a single policy.) Each of
the policies provided for Medical Pay coverage of $5,000
but contained an amendatory endorsement which provided
that, if the insured had two or mote policies providing
Medrcal Payments coverage, then the "tota-l limits of liabil-
ity under all such policies shall not exceed that of the policy
with the highest limit of liability." The lærguage effectively
puqported to block stacking of the MedicaJPay covenge,
so that State Farrn offered only $5,000 under one policy.
Save for the fact that Ruckdaschel v. State Fann in-
volved Medical Pay coverage and Bennett v, State Farm
rnvolved Undednsured Motodst coverage, the court found
the public polióy issues to be identical a:rd, in stacking the
coverages, quoted Bennett "An insurer may not place in
an insurance policy a provision that defeats coverage for
which the insurer has received valuable consideradon."
Ifohman f, Ruckdaschel" and the fact ¡hat Farm-
ers A-lliance Mutual v. Ifoleman, 1998 ìvtont. 155, 9ó1
P.zd 174, (Ifoleman II) was pending on the isstre of
validity of anti-stacking pohcy language for "additional"
coverages, prompted the auto insurance industry to ap-
proach the legislature and seek to block stacking once and
for all. In fact, the legislature amended the anti-stacking
statute, Sec. 33-23-203 MCA, through two separate acts.
Ch. 263, L. 1.997, amended the stahrte for the er?ress
purpose of "Establishing Subrogatìon Rights in Motor
Velricle Policies," while Ch. 495,L. 1997 rvas designed to
prohibit stacking of any auto insurance coverage u¡hether it
is required or excess. !7hile passage of the rwo acts has
anti-stacking proponents gleeftrlly dggrg the grave for
stacking, Mark Twain's words about the reports of the
deadr being gready exaggerated may be apropos.
Recall that the 1981 statute, Sec. 33-23-203 MC,{.,
provided the follovrng coverage limits for vehicles under a
single "motor vehicle liability policy": First, the limit of
coverage for an accident was the lir-nit for the vehicle
involved in the accident. Second, if thc i¡rst¡red vehicle
w¿sn't in the accident, the limit rvas the highest limit for
arìy one vehicle insured under the policy. Third, limits
cotrld rrot be added together. Fourth, the polìcy could
contain limitati.rns, exclusions, or reducdons of coverage
"to prevent duplicate payment for the sar¡re element oF
loss." Firrally, Sec. 33-23-204, which rvas addecl in 1987,
dcfined r "motor vehicle liability policy" as that reqtrired by
Titlc 61, Chapter ó, (the required coverages).
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In Ch. .+95, L. 1997, the legisla-
ftrre n-rade the followilrg ciranges to
that statute by addition a:rd deletion of
langr.rage:
L. Applied dre anti-stacking provi-
sions to vchicle coverages under
multipie policies as u'ell as single
policies
2. Forbade stacking regardless of
"number of policies issued by the
safile company" or the "number
of premiums paid"
3. 
-tpplied the antj-stacking langrrage
to "each coverage"
4. Provided that "for a specified cov-
erage" tìre insurer "shall cleady
iniorm or noti$" the ir.rsured in
\\'nüng of lLmrts zurd "n'hether the
coYetage frorn one policy c>1'
motor vehicle may be added to the
coverage of another..."
5. Defined "motor vehicle liability
policy/' to include "all additional
coverages" includng U^4, UIM,
and Med Pav
It is important to note that
Chapter 494 delcted the 198L lan-
guage including UM coverage under
dre prohrbition of stacking in single
policies while addrng UM to the de6-
nitjon of "motor vehicle liabiliry pol-
icy" in Sec. 33-23-204 to block stack-
ing of that coverage in the future.
Ch.263,L. 7997 had a narrower
purpose. While Sec. 33-23-203 MCA
aireadv contaìned subsection (2) which
provided that "A motor vehicle liabil-
ity policy may also provide for other
reasonable Limitations, exclusions, or
reductions of coverage which are de-
signed to prevent duplicate pa)¡ments
for the same elernent of loss," Chapter
263 added "subrogalion" into the pro-
visiorrs approved in subsection (2) md
added language to insure that subsec-
tion (2) applied to "anorher casuaìty
polìcy that provides coverage for an
urjr.rry that necessitates damages or
bene6t payments." Aside from those
chzurges, the legislature, in enacting
Clrapter 263,1eÊt the rest of the stature
intact including its reference to a
"motor vehicle liability policy" a.nd dre
de6nition of such policy which the
Montana Supreme Court had con-
stnred in Farmers Alliance Mut. fns.
Co. v. Ifoleman, ("Iloleman f") to
exclude the excess or additional Medi-
ca1 Pay and Underinsured Motorist
coverages. What is the import of the
fact drat tìre iegislauve body, m Chap-
ter 263,left the statute intact save for
approvrng subrogation clauses and as-
suring that subsection (2) would apply
to "another casualty policy" while
leaving subsecdon (1) to apply to only
a "motor vehicle liabiliry policy"
(mearnng, u¡der lfoleman, required
coverages only)?
Consider also the fact that the
same legislature passed Chapter 495
making no reference to the amend-
merrts of Chapter 263.It is important
that the ts/o amendments and their
inconsistent implicit retentjon of past
stanrtory language were codified by
the Code Commissioner into a single
combined amended version of 33-23-
203 and 204 MCA. The enactrnent of
dlese rivo chapters and the Code
Commissioner's approach to codifi ca-
tion raise several issues which are
likely to result in disagreement. For
instzurce, how is one to read the intent
of the legislatrrre in enacting each of
the two chapters insofar as each left
non-identical portions of the anti-
stacking statute intact? Can one ar.¡¡.re
that language left intact in Ch. 263 rvas
intended to be the amended statute
and that the same is true of language
left intact in Ch. 495? Can one argr.re
that the legislature's work requires that
there be separate conflicúng codifica-
tions of 263 and 495?
Subsection (3) requiring notìce
by insurers will be a source of disputed
issues. !Øhat is a "speci6ed coverage"?
Is there arly coverage that is not
"specified"? When does d.re insurer
have to notify the insured? W4rat is
the remedy if the insurer didn't
"cleady inforrn or noti$r the insured in
writing"? !ühat if the insurer ærd the
instrred disagtee as to when the in-
sured was to be noti6ed? Does the
insurer only have to noti$r if the cov-
erages "may be added" (an unlikely
happening), keeping silent if dre con-
sumer will not be allowed recovery? Is
the insured considered noti6ed in wrir
ing because the policy akeady contains
anti-stacking language in the "other
insurance" clause or the "limitation of
liability" clause? Does the insurer
have to give notice if the legrslature
said the coverages carì't be stacked,
but the policy la-nguage doesn't?
Note that Ch. 495, L. 1997 in-
volves both an "applicabiLty" date and
an "effecdve" date. The applicability
date detennines to u/rich insurance
policy the amendments apply. Chap-
ter 495 provided that the amendments
to Sec.33-23-203 and204 "applies to
all motor vehicle liability policies is-
sued or renewed after [the effectjve
U pcoMrF{c MT Lrq S nMrF{ARS
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date of this act]." The effective date of the act is May 2,
1977. Consequentl¡ earliest applicability date þeing any
date after May 2, 7977) is May 3, 7997 . The effective date of
the amendments, May 2, 1997, is the date the statute was
effectively amended, so that certain pertinent language from
the 1981 stah¡te was deleted and language from the 1997
acts was added and became effective but only for those
oolicies to which the amended statute aoolies. Take note. bv
the wa¡ that Chapter 263 states no effective date or apphca-
bility date. Neither does Ch. 2I2,L.1981, rvhich is the 1981
anti-stacking amendment. If the 1997 amendments are
compiled in the same statute, rvhat is the applicability date
and effective date of that compilation?
Though the effective date of Chapter 495 was May 2,
1997, as L mltter of applicability, a¡ì auto insurance policy
issued on May 2, 1,997, would not be subject to the 1997
amendments during the temr of that policy. Hence, it is
possible that accidents occurdng as late as May 1,1998 (the
end of such one-year policy terrns) would result in stacking '
of coverages undet policies to which ¡he 7997 amendments
will not apply. Since such claims are now only ayear old and
many haven't yet been filed as lawsuits, litigation and appeal
of stacking issues may go on for several years.
Needless to'say, for accidents occurring during the May
2, 7997 to May 2, L998, v¡indow and perhaps six months
later, counsel seeking to stack should acquire the policies and
every nodce, rider, or endorse-1nent f¡om the insurer, so that
counsel knows the status of notice to the insured. Lack of
notice may be the key to'getting afavo:ø.ble court ruling on l
'stacking.
The first inquiry for counsel seeking to stack rpill be
what law to apply. The law goveming an auto insurance
stacking claim will'depend on the terrn of the insurance
coverage. Three scenarios exist depending on the policy
terrn. First, if the accident occurred under coverage of a
policy whose terrn began on or after May 3, 1997, then by
the provisions of the 1997 amendments, no coverage under
the polìcy can oe stacked. Second, if the accident occurred
under a policy issued before the applicability date of May 3,
L997 ud before the effective date of May 2,1997, then the
1981 anti-stacking statute and the stacking decisions of the
Montana Supreme Court would apply so that only stacking
of required coverages under a single policy would be prohib-
ited. Third, whal of thg.,c4seg occurring on or after the
statute's effective daté of. May'2,' 1997 and under policies
tlrat did not expire until as late as May 2, 1998? For those
cases, the 1997 amendments would not apo_Ly, but the 1997
amendment was effective as of May 2, 1997 to delete some
provisions of the 1981 anti-stacking stahrte as of that date.
For example, Chapter 495, effective May 2, 1.997, deleted
from the 1981 anti-stacking stailte the language that previ-
ously included Uninsured Motorist coverage as a coverage
that cotrld not be stacked if multiple cars were under one
policy. To be sure, Chapter 495, L. 199? added language
blockfurg stacking for any coverage, but that language though
effective does not apply to tìre policy drat expires as late as
May 2,1998. Considering the deletions made by the 7997
amendments, it is possible the courts will face arguments
that neither deleted portions of the 1981 sratute or the 1997
amendments apply to some stacking issues. Consequentl¡
for a single policy issued May 2,1997 and covering multiple
autos for UM coverage, one could argue tlie 1981, statute no
longer blocks stacking (UM language removed effective
May 2, 1997 by Chapter 495), and the 1997 amendment
doesn't apply to that policy.
Note that the 1997 amendrpents retained the 1981
language approving "other" provisions 'ldesigned to prevent
duplicate pa)¿rnents for the same element of loss..." This
language indicates that the anti-stacking provisions under
subsection (1) of the statute are designed to prevent dupli-
cate pâyment for the same element of loss. Courts constru-
ing the statute should be reminded that its overarching intent
is to prevent duplication of payrnent for the same element
of loss. Wise counsel will not be in a position of seeking
duplicate payment for the same loss. While insurance
contract law v¡ill allow duplicate payment under Medical
Pay coverage, tort law doesn't allow duplicate payment
for the same element of loss. The goal of a-n adequate
recovery is to get all damages paid once, and that doesn't
violate the legislative intent of Sec. 33-23-203 MC,A.. A
gtavely ìnjured plaintiff seeking to recover from his or her
own insurer, UM, UIM or Med Pay benefis where damages
ex¡eed all limits of coverage will be in the best position to
(to page 24)
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argue the public policy and legislauve intent of the statute
after its amendment in 1997.
Also, it appears counsel will raise issues about
whether the amendments impair rights in effect on the
effective d¿te of the legislation, which can be argted is
imperrnissible under ,A.rticle II, Section 31 of the Montana
Constitution. Ffence, as you can see, the 1997 legislative
rush to extend the anti-stacking statute to all coverages
may have produced inconsistencies, ambiguities, and is-
sues in the codified result that can plague the attempt to
end stacking. Inventiveness of counsel in challenging the
newly amended statute in the effort to assure adequate
insurance coverage may create a hole in the anti-stacking
darn created by the 1997 legislature.
Finall¡ and very importantl¡ counsel should note
the court's decision 'tn Dakota Fire fns. Co. u. OÍe, 1998
MT 288, 55 St. Rep. ll7g,:r;.which the court held that the
198L anti-sacking statute (as of 1991) did not apply to
block stacking of uninsured motori_st coverage of multiple
vehicles under a single policy wherê the insured paid
separate premiums. The court asked "to what extent did
the provisions of Sec. 33-23-203, MCÂ (1991), supersede
the doctrine of reasonable expectations and the public
policy recognized by this court favoring the enforcement
of coverage for which an insurer has received valuable
consideration." The court noted that the statute's lat guuge
made it apply t9 bloçk stlcþg l-_legardless of the number
of motor vehicles" but didntt address whêther the rrumber
of premiums paid made a difference; Of critical impor-
tance here is the implication that the public policy of the,
reasonable expectations doctrine and the court's long cited
public poticy of protection of insureds who pay multiple
premiums may prevail over a conflicting legislative enact-
ment. The 6ght isn't over yet.
(from page 22)
brain function abiliry. This means that it is practically
impossible to predict what type of cognitive impair-
ments will result from a combination of bi¿in damage
and psychiatric illness, and the test results carmot be
looked at or analyzed in a vacuum.,
CONCLUSION
It is not, in 
^ny way,being suggested that everyperson who is ln a cx crash, whether they strike their
head or not, has suffered a traumattc brain injury. I
hope that the content of this art-icle will be of assistance
for people in understa¡rding some of the realities about
traumatic brain injury and for helping persons surviving
traumatic brain injury to obtain the respect, dignity, and
care and treatrnent they deserve anl are entitled to.
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